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ABSTRACT
Self-selection policing is the term given to the
identification of serious active offenders by dint of
their commission of more minor infractions. The
paper explores the feasibility of using the non-
production of documentation as required after the
issue of an instruction to do so (form HO/RT1)
as a way of identifying active, serious offenders.
Such non-producers (no shows):
1. were more likely to have recorded offence
histories on the Police National Computer
(PNC);
2. had offence histories comprising two or more
offences, significantly more than offending
‘shows’;
3. had offended more recently than offending
‘shows’;
4. were found to have an offence history includ-
ing serious offences;
5. typically offended after HO/RT1 issue,
demonstrating that their offending was more
current than historical.
The implications of these results for operational
policing are contended to be substantial, and are
discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Background
Recent research has focused on the feasib-
ility of identifying active, serious offenders
from their commission of lesser infractions
of the law, many relating to relatively minor
road traffic or motoring ‘summary’ offences
(Roach, 2004, 2007). This method of
‘offender self-selection’ is so termed
because, in committing minor offences,
those engaged in more serious criminality
are regarded as ‘offering themselves’ for
further, legitimate, police attention. While
many experienced and shrewd police
officers will need no persuasion about this,
the incorporation of self-selection as a gen-
eral policing style will require substantial
reorientation of police training and opera-
tional practice. Further, the application of
such a strategy requires much sensitivity,
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since the majority of citizens who self-select
will not be active offenders. They will need
persuasion that the additional attention they
can expect under self-selection is justifiable
in the wider scheme of crime control.
An increasing number of well docu-
mented and high profile cases have swelled
support for the utility of this method in
identifying serious offenders from minor
offences. Often quoted examples include
Peter Sutcliffe, the Yorkshire Ripper,
arrested initially for displaying false number
plates and the notorious US serial killer
‘Son of Sam’ apprehended on the basis of a
ticket issued for parking illegally in front of
a fire hydrant. Of course, a police officer
presented with the opportunity to make a
connection between the presenting minor
offence and the more serious undisclosed
offence will not necessarily take it. Self-
selection offers the opportunity for the
exercise of the policing craft, and is not a
substitute for it. However, few would dis-
pute that the provision to a police officer of
a legitimate reason to question a group of
whom a non-trivial proportion would be
revealed as more serious offenders is an
opportunity not to be lightly forgone. An
additional, more recent, example is provded
by the Madrid bombings, where one
bomber was stopped in his car by police for
speeding on his way to the target. Had
police been more aware of offender self-
selection and the importance of minor
offences, then maybe they would have
searched the car and found a boot full of
explosives. But of course we shall never
know.1
One early source for the utility of
offender self-selection as a tool for uncover-
ing serious criminality is a pioneering study
of illegal parking in disabled bays, in
Huddersfield, England. Findings indicated
that one in five who had committed this
seemingly minor offence had outstanding
warrants for the arrest of the registered
keeper of the vehicle, or other character-
istics which would have excited immediate
police attention (Chenery, Henshaw, &
Pease, 1999). Such findings hold important
implications with regard to understanding
offending patterns and criminal careers and,
in turn, for policing and the criminal justice
system, with regard to detecting and dealing
with serious and prolific offenders.
Support for the ‘versatile offender’ can be
found in much of the recent literature on
criminal careers, which identifies a signi-
ficant proportion of offenders as ‘crime
versatile’, as opposed to ‘specialised’ (eg
Blumstein, Cohen, Roth, & Visher, 1986;
Svensson, 2002). In a recent study matching
criminal DNA samples, offender versatility
was again supported with a significant num-
ber of murderers and sex attackers in the
sample who were found to have committed
a drug related first offence (Townsley,
Smith, & Pease, 2005). Many serious
offenders behave consistently in their dis-
regard for the law, often infracting minor
laws (such as illegal parking in disabled bays)
as well as those laws considered serious and
indictable. Such a perspective of criminality
is also consistent with Cohen and Felson’s
(1979) ‘Routine Activity Theory’ (RAT) in
which offenders are seen as committing
offences where opportunity avails itself. To
sum up, our approach is simply that ‘those
who do big bad things also usually do little
bad things’ (Roach, 2004, 2007).
The problem in detecting serious
offences is their relative rarity. Minor of-
fences are often easier to detect than the
usually infrequent, unpredictable and iso-
lated serious ones. Logic suggests, therefore,
that to focus on lesser offences would pro-
vide an additional tool for identifying seri-
ous offenders (ie those lesser offences found
most likely to be committed by this group).
This has profound implications for policing,
promising an efficient method of uncover-
ing serious offenders by concentrating on
‘trigger’ minor offences. It complements
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more traditional methods such as gathering
information from the public, knowledge
of offending patterns and the targeting of
‘known’ offenders.
Schneider (2005) in her study of the
relationship between shop theft and burg-
lary found that 80 per cent of prolific
burglars admitted committing this (gener-
ally considered) lesser offence with more
than 50 per cent admitting to doing so
every day. Schneider’s findings offer addi-
tional support for the offender self-selection
approach. In committing the more minor
offence of shop theft, individuals are ‘self-
selecting’ for increased police scrutiny —
scrutiny that may uncover the shop thieves
as ‘burglars on their day off ’ (Schneider).
Schneider’s study aside, most research on
‘offender self-selection’ has focused on the
commission of road traffic (motoring)
offences (Roach, 2004, 2007). The prin-
cipal reason for this revolves around the
notion that although only a minority
of drivers are criminals, a vast majority of
criminals are drivers (West Midlands Police,
1997). The challenge for the offender self-
selection approach lies in identifying which
minor traffic offences serve as the most
reliable indicators of more serious offend-
ing, ie which can appropriately be used as
‘trigger’ offences (Roach, 2004, 2007).
Trigger offences in their commission war-
rant further police attention as they are the
most likely to pay dividends in uncovering
active, serious offenders. However, such
police attention must also impose the mini-
mum of inconvenience upon members of
the public (Roach, 2007), to whom the
logic of self-selection policing must be
communicated.
Although research in this area is still in its
infancy, several other studies have produced
findings that link various traffic offences to
more serious criminality. In a study of seri-
ous traffic offenders it was found that those
repeatedly offending were likely to be
engaged in mainstream criminality, with a
drink driver, for example, twice as likely to
possess a criminal record as a random mem-
ber of the public (Rose, 2000).
A study investigating a link between
fixed penalty notices (FPN) for minor traf-
fic offences and concurrent criminality,
found that the likelihood increased the
higher the number of FPNs an individual
held. It was not the imposition of a single or
specific FPN that suggested the perpetrator
was engaged in concurrent criminality but
the number of FPNs incurred: the higher
the number, the more likely the concurrent
criminality (Wellsmith & Guille 2005).
A small, localised study of visitors to a
Young Offender Institution (YOI) found
that one in six visitor drivers had com-
mitted a motoring offence en route to the
YOI. A significant number of such visitors
were found on the Police National Com-
puter (PNC) for prior offences, some seri-
ous. Several were identified as active,
serious offenders (eg wanted on warrant,
disqualified drivers, burglars) and arrested as
a result of further police scrutiny (Roach,
2007). This study is on the margins of the
emerging self-selection literature in that
visiting a prisoner friend is not a criminal
offence. While the context yielded a high
‘hit rate’ of identified criminality, it should
not itself be used as a trigger. In this case,
automatic number plate recognition
(ANPR) scrutiny provided the trigger, not
the visit per se.
An incidental finding from Roach’s
(2007) study was that 25 per cent of drivers
issued with the form Home Office Road
Traffic 1 (HO/RT1) failed to produce the
required documents (ie did not comply).
The form HO/RT1 required them to pro-
duce their documents (eg driver’s licence
and insurance certificate) on request, or at a
police station for checking within 28 days
(the time period has recently been reduced
to 7 days). Roach (2007) raises the follow-
ing questions. Why do so many fail to
produce? Is it because they have something
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to hide? Is it because of a general contempt
for criminal justice? Is it, in short, that the
‘little bad thing’ of failing to produce is a
flag of the ‘big bad things’ in which they are
also engaged. Their active criminality is a
possibility worth exploring.
A recent inquiry by the Independent
Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)
into the murder of Hayley Jane Richards
(by her ex-partner, Hugo Quintas) detailed
a complaint that there had been at least one
opportunity to arrest him when local traffic
police stopped him for having a damaged
nearside tail light (IPCC, 2006). The of-
ficers concerned were not unduly suspi-
cious and simply issued him with an HO/
RT1. A PNC check was carried out to
ascertain the owner of the vehicle but a
force intelligence check was not requested.
Had it been, it would have identified
Quintas as wanted by police for a serious
assault on Richards and tragic events may
never have unfolded as they did. Quintas
had, two months previous to the murder,
been issued with a previous HO/RT1 with
which he failed to comply. The Criminal
Justice Unit had failed to take any action.
The present paper explores the utility of
offender self-selection as a tool for uncover-
ing serious criminality, by detailing a study
focused on a wider sample of motorists
issued with an HO/RT1 than was available
to the author in the study cited above
(Roach, 2007). The hypothesis is that fail-
ure to comply with this routine legal
requirement reflects chronic and possibly
serious criminality in a proportion of those
so failing.
Reasons for non-compliance with HO/
RT1 are likely to include:
● the driver not having had any current
motor insurance;
● the driver not having had a current Min-
istry of Transport test certificate (MOT)
for the vehicle;
● the driver travelling in a stolen vehicle;
● the driver having an identity other than
that disclosed to the police officer;
● the driver being prevented from comply-
ing by another party (eg a criminal
spouse);
● the driver not wishing to draw any police
attention to him/herself for fear of
exposing serious criminality;
● a general belief in the impotence of
policing and criminal justice, often all
too justified amongst those imbued in
criminality.
All these putative reasons, except having an
identity other than that disclosed to the
police officer, assume that the police will
not pursue them for failure to produce
documents as required by HO/RT1. In
many cases (see below), the writer has
observed this to be a fair assumption.
Before moving onto an explanation of
the method used in this research, it is per-
tinent to introduce the purpose of the
HO/RT1, the legal requirements which it
imposes and its current level of use in
routine policing.
The HO/RT1 process
The Road Traffic Act 1988, ss. 164 and 165,
as amended by the Road Traffic Act 1991,
enable a police officer to demand the pro-
duction of a driving licence, insurance
details, MOT and other relevant docu-
ments, by the driver of a motor vehicle. If
these documents are not at hand, the driver
must ‘produce’ them at a police station
within seven days, failure to do so being a
prosecutable offence.
Where the offence appears to the officer
to involve obligatory endorsement, and
the driver concerned does not produce the
requested documents at the scene, an officer
may issue an HO/RT1 requiring the indi-
vidual to produce them within seven days at
a police station geographically convenient
to the driver. Officers should conduct a
PNC check of the vehicle and driver and
HO/RT1culture
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can, at their discretion, also conduct local
force intelligence checks before the HO/
RT1 is issued. In cases where an individual
is charged with a substantive offence, it
appears commonplace not to issue an HO/
RT1, the more serious crime taking pre-
cedence, for example driving whilst under
the influence of alcohol.
Generally, there is some consensus on
HO/RT1 usage between forces, at least in
terms of policy. However, in other respects
HO/RT1 usage appears to be a matter of
individual force policy, with differences
relating both to the wider utility of HO/
RT1 (ie beyond just checking insurance
documents and vehicle ownership), and also
to the administrative burden associated with
extensive use. Devon and Cornwall Con-
stabulary (2005), like most forces, have
issued guidance to their officers that, if
drivers are unable to produce documents at
the scene, HO/RT1s must be issued to all
drivers of motor vehicles in the following
circumstances with the request to ‘record
details’:
● at the scene of all road collisions, even if
no further action is anticipated against
any of the drivers;
● when reporting a person for any offence
other than by way of a fixed penalty
ticket.
The South Wales Police Authority (2004)
states that HO/RT1s for the production of
driving documents can only be issued by
officers in the following circumstances:
● to persons involved or suspected of being
involved in a road traffic collision;
● to persons who are reasonably suspected
of committing a road traffic offence;
● to the driver/keeper of a motor vehicle,
or person supervising a provisional
licence holder, who fails to produce
immediately any relevant documentation
for inspection.
There is also individual officer discretion to
‘muddy the waters’ a little more as the
IPCC report (IPCC, 2006, p. 52) into
the murder of Hayley Jane Richards
acknowledges:
An officer has a certain amount of dis-
cretion when it comes to stopping a
vehicle and that [sic] it is not always
necessary to do a PNC check on its
occupants. It would be down to the
circumstances and the type of offence
committed.
In fact, as a result of conversations with
several officers, the author has found that
officer discretion is paramount in deciding
whether a driver is issued with an HO/
RT1. A specific, but unnamed officer, when
asked by the author to help clarify the
thought and decision processes which of-
ficers engage in when stopping a vehicle,
described it thus:
Once stopped and the driver cannot pro-
duce his documents, there and then, the
officer then has the option of issuing a
HO/RT1. However, first the officer
would normally check PNC to see if
there is any insurance for the vehicle in
question. If it comes back insurance held
and the driver appears legitimate the
officer will probably use discretion and
not use a HO/RT1. If however, the
driver cannot produce his licence or
there is no insurance for the vehicle held
on PNC, the officer then has the discre-
tion to issue the HO/RT1. If the officer
stops a car and is not happy with the
driver, and the driver cannot prove who
he is then the officer has the option of
arresting the driver for no document . . .
Once identity has been established the
officer could decide to release and issue a
HO/RT1. Basically, if the person is
arrested for any offence we would try to
establish he had documents for his car
Roach
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whilst in custody. If this is not possible
then a HO/RT1 could be issued.
The HO/RT1 issue process therefore does
not appear to be driven by specific policing
policy or guidance. Indeed, as the officer
quoted above also said, ‘So as you can see
the issue of a HO/RT1 is very much at the
discretion of the officer and there are no
fixed rules’. Officer discretion should,
therefore, be considered an important con-
founding variable and is discussed later in
this paper.
Once issued, the front of the HO/RT1
must not be altered in any way. If a mistake
is found, or an officer is asked to clarify a
discrepancy, corrections must be made by
way of statement. In their notebooks, of-
ficers should record the circumstances of
issue of the HO/RT1 for use in any sub-
sequent court proceedings.
When the required documents are pro-
duced at a police station (as a result of a
HO/RT1 issue) the form HO/RT2 is
completed immediately. When none (or
only part) of the required documentation is
presented, a reminder is sent but if it is not
acted upon, then the force central ticket
office issues a court summons to the offend-
ing driver. The author has found substantial
supporting evidence that this does not
always happen, particularly when a driver
has given false details. The police do not
have time to exhaust every avenue in pur-
suit of those deliberately failing to comply
with the HO/RT1 process and a significant
number of people are never traced or
prosecuted.
Recently, with regard to many police
forces in England and Wales, if officers have
any doubts about a driver’s identity they are
permitted to inform that driver of their
intention to take a thumbprint or photo-
graph at the time of issuing the HO/RT1.
This paper details the proportion of indi-
viduals who do not comply with HO/RT1
requirements, suggests reasons they might
not so comply, and establishes a link
between HO/RT1 non-compliance and
serious criminality. This paper focuses on
the extent to which HO/RT1 non-
compliance can be considered a tool of
offender self-selection, assisting police to
uncover more serious criminality from the
relatively minor infraction of not producing
vehicle/driving documents.
METHOD
Sample
All the HO/RT1s issued by the Lancashire
Constabulary Central Ticket Office on 1
December 2004 constitute the sample.
Although this specific date was aribitrarily
selected, choice of a day in 2004 permits
comparison of offending histories before
and after HO/RT1 issue. In total 129 HO/
RT1s were issued on this date across
Lancashire.
Participants
Those to whom HO/RT1s were issued
were not aware of the study. All personal
information (ie names, addresses, vehicle
registration numbers and information of
any previous recorded offences) was kept on
the Lancashire Constabulary computer
system/network. All criminal history checks
were conducted by staff based at Lancashire
Constabulary, Preston Division, using both
the PNC and the SLEUTH (Lancashire
Constabulary Intelligence) databases. Of-
ficers were considered as ‘only doing what
they should have anyway’, by responding to
HO/RT1 issues.
Procedure
A simple database was created detailing all
those issued with an HO/RT1 in Lanca-
shire on 1 December 2004. Variable fields
were created for HO/RT1 issue number,
name, address, postcode, vehicle registration
number and reason for issue. 28 days from
HO/RT1culture
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the date of issue, the HO/RT1 disposals in
question were tracked using the Lancashire
Constabulary Central Ticket Office com-
puter system and outcomes entered on a
database accordingly. This period was
considered long enough to establish an out-
come of the process flowing from HO/
RT1 issue as the recipients were required to
comply with HO/RT1 conditions within
seven days. Disposal outcomes distinguished
those who had ‘complied fully’ from those
considered ‘possible prosecutions’, as they
had either produced only part of the
required documentation, or had not pro-
duced any at all.
Police staff from Lancashire Constabul-
ary, Preston Division, conducted a back-
ground analysis of all the participants (as
discussed above), with particular focus on
any known offending history or intelligence
to that effect. This information, appro-
priately anonymised, was entered on our
database allowing comparison of whether
an individual complied/did not comply
with the HO/RT1, whether they had
offending histories and whether they were
active, serious offenders around the time of
HO/RT1 issue. The results are set out
below.
RESULTS
From a total HO/RT1 cohort of 129 indi-
viduals, 105 (81 per cent) were issued to
male and 24 (19 per cent) to female drivers.
Driver age ranged from 17 to 83 years, with
a mean of 32 years and a standard deviation
of 12 years. Ages did not differ by gender
(independent means t test).
49 (38 per cent) drivers had failed to
produce the required documentation
within the 28-day period (‘no shows’) and
were therefore considered ‘prosecutable’,
leaving 80 (62 per cent) who had fully
‘complied’ (‘shows’).
Background recorded offence checks
(PNC) identified almost 30 per cent (n=44)
of the cohort as having a recorded offence
marker, leaving 70 per cent (n=85) who did
not. A simple two by two contingency table
showed a statistically significant association
between the no show group and the exist-
ence of a PNC offence history (χ2=18.65,
df=1, p<0.001). 57 per cent of those who
failed to show were found to have such a
history.
Shows and no shows
Neither sex nor age was associated with
show/no show status. A total number of
360 offences were on record against mem-
bers of the cohort. 75 per cent (n=269) of
these had been committed by the no show
group. The no show group was found to
have a number of recorded offences almost
five times greater than the shows (no shows
M=5.7, SD=11.17; shows M=1.2,
SD=4.8). See Table 1.
An independent samples t test indicated a
significant difference between the two
Table 1: Number of recorded offences per group
Group
Total number of
people in group
Total number of
recorded offences
Mean number of
recorded offences
Range of number
of offences Std dev
Show 79 91 1.15 0–39 4.8
No show 47 269 5.72 0–58 11.17
Total 126* 360 2.85 0-62 8.5
* An offence history could not be determined for three individuals.
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groups with regard to number of recorded
offences (t=–3.193, df=124, p=0.001, two-
tailed). Not only did significantly more of
the no show group have recorded offence
histories, but this group had (at least histor-
ically) a much higher rate of recorded offend-
ing. Since they were no older than the
shows (indeed they were on average two
years younger), the difference is not because
they had had longer to accumulate a record.
Further, 42 per cent (n=20) of the no show
group had offence records which comprised
more than three separate offences, whereas
this was only 6 per cent (n=5) for the show
group.
A statistically significant difference was
found between the show and no show
groups with regard to specific offence types.
In volume, the no show group had com-
mitted significantly more offences against
property, theft, fraud and deception, driving
whilst disqualified, and weapons offences.
This group had also committed significantly
more of what are termed ‘police, courts and
probation offences’ where the individual
fails to turn up to a compulsory meeting (eg
for sentencing, or bail) or gives false details.
In sum, 30 per cent of the no show group
had a history of non-compliance with such
legal requirements as opposed to less than 4
per cent of the show group. Not surpris-
ingly those with a history of non-
compliance failed to comply with the
HO/RT1 issued.
A simple contrast of criminal records
between shows and no shows does not, of
course, indicate that the no shows were
criminally active at the time of HO/RT1
issue and that is the necessary condition for
self-selection policing to be viable. The next
section addresses the timing of the criminal-
ity of the two groups.
Shows, no shows and timing of
offending relative to HO/RT1
As discussed previously, all PNC checks
were carried out in April 2006, with the
HO/RT1 date being 1 December 2004.
This afforded opportunity to conduct
before and after analysis of offending, a
criminal career window incorporating
offences prior to and after 1 December
2004 (date of HO/RT1 issue).
Individuals in the cohort were assigned
to one of four categories:
1. non-offenders (ie no recorded offence
history);
2. those who had recorded offending before
their HO/RT1 issue only;
3. those who had offending recorded both
before and after HO/RT1 issue;
4. those who had recorded offending dat-
ing after HO/RT1 issue only.
Table 2 details the number of individuals in
each category by show/no show status. The
mean age for each group (in years up to
April 2006) is also tabulated.
As can be seen from Table 2, 25 per cent
of those comprising the ‘no offence history’
category were no shows. This finding is
consistent with general estimates of HO/
RT1 non-compliance for the general driver
population (Cheshire Constabulary (n.d.)
estimate it to be as high as one-third). The
percentage was seen to increase from 25 per
cent of those in the ‘no offence history’
category, to 50 per cent of those in the
‘recorded offending after HO/RT1 issue
only’ category, to 57 per cent of those in
the ‘recorded offending before HO/RT1
issue’ category, to an overwhelming 80 per
cent of those  in the ‘before and after HO/
RT1 issue’ category. This indicates strongly
that, overall, those most likely not to show
had committed offences both before and
after the issue of the HO/RT1.
Of the no shows, almost 30 per cent
were actively criminal, in the sense that
they were officially processed for offences
during the 18 months following the no show.
This contrasts with some 8 per cent of the
shows. Further analysis was concentrated on
HO/RT1culture
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those who offended in 2005, up to a year
after HO/RT1 issue, in order to guage
further whether the no show group repre-
sented the active criminal contingent. Table
3 details those who committed offences in
2003, 2004 and 2005, and whether they
belonged to the show or no show group. As
can been seen, considerably more of those
from the no show group committed a
recorded offence in 2004 (most around the
time of the HO/RT1 issue) than those in
the show group, suggesting that a significant
percentage of non-compliers are commit-
ting, or go on to commit further offences
close to the HO/RT1 issue. Fewer of those
in the no show group offended the year
before, or more than a year after, HO/RT1
issue, again supporting a hypothesis that
those who do not comply do not do so in
orderr to mask concurrent offending.
The offender categories were collapsed
into two categories by including ‘the before
and after HO/RT1 issue’ with ‘after only’.
The logic for this approach is that the key
issue is whether criminality followed HO/
RT1 issue, and whether there had been
recorded criminality before issue is of
limited interest. Indeed, it might be said
that HO/RT1 no show provides a particu-
larly useful flag of active criminality in the
absence of prior recorded offending.
The results were statistically significant
(χ2=10.87, df=1, p<0.01). The criminality
of the no shows is therefore not one of
mere historical interest.
Those who comprise the ‘before and
after’ and ‘after only’ categories should jus-
tifiably be considered ‘active’ offenders (the
‘active group’). An overall finding was that
28 per cent of no shows would be active
offenders. Consequently, further police
scrutiny of HO/RT1 no shows would pay
huge dividends with regard to identifying
active offenders. Having identified a link
between no shows and active offending,
Table 2: Offending histories before and after HO/RT1 issue
Offender categories HO/RT1 shows HO/RT1 no show Total
No offence history
Mean age 32.7
64 21 85
Before HORT1 issue only
Mean age 29.9
9 12 21
Before and after HORT1 issue
Mean age 27.7
3 11 14
After HORT1 issue only
Mean age 33
3 3 6
Total 79* (62%) 47* (37%) 126*
* Three criminal histories were incomplete (one show and two no shows) so a complete analysis was impossible.
Table 3: Offending histories before and
after HO/RT1 issue
Year HO/RT1
show group
HO/RT1 no
show group
2003 43% 57%
2004* 10% 90%
2005 50% 50%*
* HO/RT1 issued in December 2004.
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focus switched to a more detailed analysis of
criminal careers and offence seriousness.
HO/RT1 no shows as active, serious
offenders
Offence histories were analysed further to
see whether a no show could be linked to
more serious criminality. Analysis was con-
ducted which focused on the type of
offence committed by the active group.
Table 4 summarises the offence types for
the active group, comprising 14 individual
offence histories.
As can be seen from Table 4, the PNC
histories of the active offender group indi-
cate participation in serious criminality. For
example, half the group had committed
offences against the person (including vio-
lence), two-thirds had committed public
order offences (including threatening
behaviour), and one-third had drugs con-
victions. Also important was the high pro-
portion of the active group who had
committed theft (79 per cent). The prior
offence of most interest when distinguish-
ing those likely not to comply with a HO/
RT1 is police, courts and prison (PCP).
This type of offence goes some way to
explaining the reasons for a no show. The
analysis of HO/RT1 disposal outcomes
which follows explores this further.
HO/RT1 disposal outcomes
To access criminal history information, the
driver must have at least reported his name
(or supplied a plausible identity). There is a
case for saying that those who could not be
traced are more active and prolific than
other no shows.
Analysis of HO/RT1 disposal outcomes
for the 49 no shows suggested that 10 had
been classed as ‘untraceable’, for several dif-
ferent reasons. First, untraceable may mean
that the individual issued with the HO/
RT1 had given a false name and address to
the issuing officer, with the intention of
avoiding a subsequent court summons. The
false name given did not have a criminal
record. Second, one no show showed his
documents on his designated court date,
possibly because he had found them at the
last minute but, more probably, he intended
to waste court and police time which is
quite a common practice.
At the time of HO/RT1 issue, only one
of the ten ‘untraceables’ was known to the
PNC for prior offences, yet two committed
offences within six months of the HO/RT1
issue (driving whilst disqualified and
burglary). This left seven completely
unknowns, possibly active, serious offenders
of which the police had no knowledge. If a
previous finding that 57 per cent of the no
show group had criminal histories is applied
to the untraceable group, then at least six of
this group should be justifiably considered
active offenders. The fact that they gave
false details indicates that this is very prob-
ably a conservative estimate.
What exactly constitutes ‘untraceable’
should be the subject of future research.
The author compared the addresses given
by those said to be untraceable with the
electoral register for 2004 (the period of
study) and found that half of the identities
Table 4: A summary of recorded offences
for the ‘active’ group
Type of offence
Number of offenders
committing (n=14)
Offences against the person 7 (50%)
Offences against property 7 (50%)
Theft and kindred 11 (79%)
Public disorder 9 (64%)
Driving whilst disqualified 5 (36%)
Police, courts and prison (PCP) 10 (71%)
Drugs 5 (36%)
Air-guns/weapons 3 (21%)
Fraud and kindred 4 (29%)
HO/RT1culture
Page 366
given matched people on the electoral reg-
ister. The names were registered at the
addresses given. What is not known at pres-
ent is to what extent police tried to trace
these individuals further. For example it
could be that these were names and ad-
dresses of people known to a no show
driver but not those of the driver himself or
herself. Those not on the electoral register
at all are more understandably untraceable.
Of the remaining 40 no shows, all
received penalties for having failed to pro-
vide evidence of adequate motor insurance,
MOT, and some failed to produce a driving
licence. Only one driver was convicted of
‘deception’ by giving an officer false details.
A discussion of the findings and implica-
tions for policing now follows.
Predicting from shows and no shows
Perhaps, at this juncture, it is pertinent to
provide a brief recapitulation of the findings
of this small study so far as a basis for the
next analysis. It was found that no shows
differed from shows with regard to an
increased likelihood of:
● having a recorded offence history,
comprising
● a greater number of recorded offences,
● of both a serious nature and more recent
in occurrence.
A multiple linear regression analysis was
performed to ascertain which of the above
variables was the most significant predictor
of a no show, and in reverse what would be
predicted about an offender by an HO/
RT1 no show. Age was added to identify
any influence that it might have on no show
prediction, although age had already been
discounted previously as a significant factor
in no shows. The criterion (dependent)
variable selected was show/no show and the
four predictor variables were: number of
offences, recency of offending (up to HO/
RT1 issue), offending since HO/RT1 and
age. The adjusted R2 for the full model
was 0.75 (F(1, 39) = 4.259, p<0.05 (using
stepwise method). The only significant vari-
able was recency of offending (β=0.314,
p=0.046); age, number of offences and
offences since HO/RT1 were not found to
be significant additional predictors in this
model.
The results showed that recency of
offending was the strongest predictor vari-
able accounting for 75 per cent of the
overall variance. That is, whether indi-
viduals would be shows or no shows was
dependent on the recency of their offend-
ing: those having offended most recently to
the HO/RT1 issue were those most likely
not to show. The implications of this find-
ing will be addressed fully in the discussion
section which follows.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Why police should focus on no shows
The hypothesis was that a significant pro-
portion of those who fail to comply with
HO/RT1 would be engaged in active
criminality, including serious offending. A
number of important findings can be drawn
from the analysis in support which, when
added, provide a rudimentary profile of
those likely not to show, and what this
might mean in terms of the police uncover-
ing active, serious offenders.
● No shows were found significantly more
likely than shows to have recorded
offence histories (PNC).
● No shows were found significantly more
likely to have offence histories compris-
ing two or more offences than offending
shows (many had three or more).
● No shows were found to have offended
more recently than shows.
● No shows were found to have an offence
history including serious offences.
● A significant number of no show disposal
outcomes could not be traced, suggesting
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the commonality of drivers giving false
names and addresses.
● The offending of no shows typically fol-
lowed HO/RT1 issue, demonstrating
that their offending was more current
than historical.
This study helps to provide a rudimentary
profile of who is and who is not likely to
fail to comply with an HO/RT1. The dem-
onstrated utility of focusing on HO/RT1
no shows to help identify serious offenders
demands the need for police to take HO/
RT1 use seriously. With officers routinely
conducting PNC checks for individuals
being issued with an HO/RT1, the prac-
tical implications of this study are that:
● fingerprints should be taken from young
male drivers as they are those most at risk
of non-compliance;
● if PNC checks show a history of three or
more offences, then the individual is
likely to not show and to be engaged in
active criminality, possibly of a serious
nature: scrutiny should be directed at
these individuals;
● if the individual has a record of recent
offences, then he is likely to be an active
offender and unlikely to show: scrutiny
again should be employed;
● if PNC checks indicate recent offences of
theft, burglary, public disorder and PCP,
then a further background scrutiny
should be employed;
● scrutiny of those who do not comply
with HO/RT1 will most likely pay divi-
dends and uncover offending of a more
serious nature.
Of course, these recommendations are not
mutually exclusive. An individual, for
example, who has committed a recent
burglary with a history of other offences,
should be a priority for further scrutiny as
the likelihood is that he is engaged in
concurrent offending and will not comply
with the HO/RT1 (ie, will be a no
show).
These findings, although holding strong
implications for the use of HO/RT1, must
be considered in an appropriate context.
Non-compliance, on many occasions, may
be the result of the driver not possessing the
necessary documents, such as motoring
insurance. Those with criminal histories
will perhaps find such premiums extor-
tionate and will instead take a chance by
driving ‘illegally’ (as, for example, did the
serial murderer, Fred West). There is no
reason to doubt the research literature
that this relatively minor infraction of the
law is symptomatic of a wider disregard for
the law.
Using HO/RT1 as a self-selection tool
does not immediately identify a serious
offender from one who is likely to commit
a minor infraction, but the findings do
indicate strongly that failure to equate those
likely not to show with active and more
serious criminality — by not digging a little
deeper into the activities of this group —
would be foolhardy, as exemplified in the
IPCC inquiry into the murder of Hayley
Jane Richards.
The age-old call for more research in this
area is justified in this case, preferably on a
much larger and wider scale covering the
whole country, allowing for a wider
appraisal of utility. That said, even the pres-
ent limited results seem worthy of applica-
tion by police forces across the country.
The application of these findings will
depend upon public cooperation. Recent
years have seen much criticism of the police
for strict enforcement of motoring offences.
Self-selection policing will require citizens,
and especially motorists, to be prepared for,
and not resentful of, fuller police checks
being made when their vehicles are
stopped. This consideration is noted in the
IPCC inquiry into the Hayley Jane
Richards murder, regarding the complaint
that police failed to arrest the wanted
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Quintas before the murder. The inquiry
report concludes that:
A police officer could declare that all
drivers stopped under section 163 of the
Road Traffic Act 1988 would have their
identification details checked against the
PNC and the local force intelligence
database. Such a ‘trawl’ would undoubt-
edly, from time to time, lead a police
officer to those liable to arrest and, no
doubt, some arrests would follow. How-
ever, this was not the rule in Wiltshire
Constabulary at this time and, were it to
become so, it would need to enjoy public
confidence if it were not to be perceived
as just another unreasonable and oppres-
sive extension to police surveillance, par-
ticularly by members of minority
communities. (IPCC, 2006, p. 55)
However, the findings of this paper
emphatically demonstrate a need for police
officers to complete all checks as a matter of
routine, not in order merely to identify
those committing minor infractions of the
law — such as a defective tail light — but
because of the important links shown
between such minor offending and more
serious criminals. In essence, the utility of
self-selection policing goes way beyond
the full stop of simply identifying minor
offences.
With regard to public support, commun-
ication of the reasons, on a case by case
basis, is possible and very desirable. The
motorist backlash in respect of HO/RT1
non-production should be less acute than it
would be (for example) in checks on
vehicles in disabled bays. This is because the
perpetrator has both committed an offence
initially, and failed to comply with legal
requirements subsequently. Nonetheless,
the public acceptance of self-selection
policing is almost certainly the largest ob-
stacle to its implementation, alongside the
development of the policing skills necessary
for the detection of the more serious
offending which seems to be linked with
the failure to produce documentation. The
findings of the Hayley Jane Richards
inquiry should go some way to reducing
the obstacles of public acceptance.
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NOTES
(1) The author cannot locate an exact ref-
erence for this example but is con-
vinced it was mentioned in one of the
numerous BBC news reports covering
the Madrid bombing. Silke (2003)
states that a member of the group
which targeted the World Trade Centre
in the late 1990s was similarly stopped
for speeding en route to his target.
(2) As per the Police National Computer
on 10 April 2006.
(3) Up to April 2006.
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